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FOREWORD
The issue of sustainable development has multiple aspects, 
all of which need to be considered if sustainability is to be 
guaranteed. On the environmental front, climate change 
and depletion of natural resources are two factors that are 
threatening the earth’s ability to regenerate. On the economic 
front, development that does not pay sufficient attention 
to income inequality and provision of basic needs to all is 
a process in danger of imploding. This essay explores the 
role that finance can play to ensure that investment protects 
the environment and promotes economic systems that are 
internally sustainable. 
Dirk Schoenmaker argues that seeing the role of finance 
as one of allocating funding to productive investments in 
a narrow sense is no longer appropriate. What constitutes 
‘productive’ cannot be independent of a project’s environ-
mental and socio-economic impact because there are often 
trade-offs between short-term profits and long-term impact. 
What might appear to be a profitable project over a given 
time period could have negative impacts that might only 
become apparent in the longer term. This essay discusses 
these trade-offs in the context of the conflicting objectives 
of shareholders and other stakeholders: the motivation of 
6the former to generate profits might at times jeopardise the 
long-term interests of the latter. This essay shows how that is 
a consequence of short-termism and a failure to act with the 
collective interest in mind. But if sustainability is paramount, 
as it should be, then the shareholders’ and stakeholders’ 
motives need to be better aligned. 
This essay provides a framework for moving in this direc-
tion and offers guidelines to counter short-termism, with an 
emphasis on incentive-compatible measures for all. Moving 
from traditional to sustainable finance means having to coun-
ter attitudes that are embedded in the ways our economic 
systems are organised. Shifting away from them requires 
both new ways of operating but, importantly, new underlying 
principles that put sustainability centre stage to guide our 
thinking. It is important that we put this process in motion, 
and the earlier the better.
Maria Demertzis, Deputy Director of Bruegel
Brussels, July 2017
1 INTRODUCTION
The Industrial Revolution, and the development of 
production processes dependent on fossil fuels that it 
triggered, has brought prosperity in the form of economic 
and population growth. At the same time, this evolution 
away from a previously ‘empty’ world1 with abundant 
natural resources has intensified social and environmental 
challenges. Mass production in a competitive economic 
system has led to long working hours, underpayment and 
child labour, first in the developed world and later relocated 
to the developing world. Social regulations have been 
increasingly introduced to counter these practices and to 
promote decent work and access to education and health 
care. Mass production and consumption is also stressing 
the Earth system through pollution and depletion of 
natural resources. Climate change is now the most pressing 
ecological constraint.
There is broad agreement on the need for a transition 
to a low-carbon, circular economy to overcome these 
environmental challenges. While an early transition – with 
1 In the empty world scenario, the economy is very small relative to the larger 
environmental ecosystem and the environment is thus not scarce. Continued 
growth of the physical economy into a non-growing ecosystem will eventually 
lead to the ‘full world economy’ (Daly and Farley, 2011).
8substantial cuts in carbon emissions starting in 2020 – 
would allow for production and consumption patterns to 
be gradually adjusted, a late transition – starting in 2030 – is 
likely to cause sudden shocks and lead to the stranding of 
assets that have lost their productive value (ASC, 2016). Many 
natural resources companies are still in denial, irrationally 
counting on a late and gradual transition. To guide the 
transformation towards a sustainable and inclusive economy, 
the United Nations (2015) has developed the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development, which will require behavioural 
change.
Sustainable development is an integrated concept with 
three aspects: economic, social and environmental. This 
essay starts by explaining the sustainability challenges that 
society is facing. On the environmental front, climate change, 
land-use change, biodiversity loss and depletion of natural 
resources are destabilising the Earth system. Next, poverty, 
hunger and lack of health care are signs that many people live 
below minimum social standards. Sustainable development 
means that current and future generations should have the 
resources they need, such as food, water, health care and 
energy, without stressing the Earth system.
Why should finance contribute to sustainable develop-
ment? The main task of the financial system is to allocate 
funding to its most productive use. Finance can play a role 
in allocating investment to sustainable companies and 
projects and thus accelerate the transition to a low-carbon, 
circular economy. Sustainable finance considers how finance 
(investing and lending) interacts with economic, social and 
environmental issues. In the allocation role, finance can 
assist in making strategic decisions on the trade-offs between 
9sustainable goals. Moreover, investors can exert influence 
over the companies they invest in. Long-term investors can 
thus steer companies towards sustainable business practices. 
Finally, finance is good at pricing risk for valuation purposes 
and can thus help to deal with the inherent uncertainty about 
environmental issues, such as the impact of carbon emissions 
on climate change. Finance and sustainability both look to 
the future.
Table 1: A framework for sustainable finance
Sustainable finance 
typology
Value created
Ranking of 
factors
Horizon
Sustainable 
Finance 1.0
Shareholder value F > S and E Short term
Sustainable 
Finance 2.0
Stakeholder value T = F + S + E
Medium 
term
Sustainable 
Finance 3.0
Common good 
value
S and E > F Long term
Source: Bruegel. Note: F = financial value; S = social impact; E = environmental 
impact; T = total value. At Sustainable Finance 1.0, the maximisation of F is 
subject to minor S and E constraints.
The thinking about sustainable finance has gone through 
different stages over the last few decades (see Table 1). The 
focus is gradually shifting from short-term profit towards 
long-term value creation. This essay analyses these stages 
and provides a new framework for sustainable finance. 
Financial and non-financial firms traditionally adopt the 
shareholder model, with profit maximisation as the main 
goal. A first step in sustainable finance (1.0 in Table 1) would 
be for financial institutions to avoid investing in companies 
with very negative impacts, such as tobacco, cluster bombs 
or whale hunting. Some firms are starting to include social 
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and environmental considerations in the stakeholder 
model (Sustainable Finance 2.0). We highlight the tension 
between the shareholder and stakeholder models. Should 
policymakers allow a shareholder-oriented firm to take 
over a stakeholder-oriented firm? Or do we need to protect 
firms that are more advanced in sustainability? Another key 
development is the move from risk to opportunity. While 
financial firms have started to avoid (very) unsustainable 
companies from a risk perspective (Sustainable Finance 1.0 
and 2.0), the frontrunners are now increasingly investing in 
sustainable companies and projects to create value for the 
wider community (Sustainable Finance 3.0).
This essay also looks at the obstacles to the adoption of 
sustainable finance, including a failure to act collectively and 
short-termism. To address the shortfall in corporate efforts, 
governments should ultimately translate the aggregate long-
term social and environmental preferences of their citizens 
into appropriate regulation and taxation (eg appropriate 
carbon taxes). Finance is about anticipating such policies 
and incorporating expectations into today’s valuations for 
investment decisions.
Possible solutions to counter short-termism are a more 
long-term oriented corporate reporting structure (moving 
away from quarterly reporting), pay structure for executives 
(eg deferred rewards and clawback provisions), invest-
ment performance horizons (moving away from quarterly 
benchmarking) and incentives for long-term investors (eg 
loyalty shares). It is important to design these measures in an 
incentive-compatible manner. In this way, executives’ and 
investors’ horizons can become more aligned and focused on 
the longer term.
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Finally, this essay outlines how long-term (institutional) 
investors can build effective coalitions to accelerate the 
transformation to sustainable development. While the early 
adopters of sustainability are primarily based in Europe, 
major players in North America and Asia have also joined 
the emerging coalitions for sustainable finance. Sustainable 
investing has thus become a global force. In this essay, we 
develop guidelines for sustainable finance, which are sum-
marised in Box 1.
Box 1: Guidelines for sustainable finance
Social and environmental externalities are by their nature 
not incorporated in the decisions taken by companies and 
investors. As most externalities play out in the medium to 
long term, the problem is aggravated by the short horizon 
executives and investors work to. Moreover, the efficient mar-
kets hypothesis, which states that stock prices incorporate all 
relevant information and thus reflect the fundamental value 
of the firm, reinforces the focus on stock price as a central 
performance measure for executive and investor perfor-
mance.
This essay develops the following guidelines to govern 
sustainable finance:
Company perspective
• Move from shareholder to stakeholder value approach, 
whereby a company balances the interests of all its stake-
holders: customers, employees, suppliers, shareholders 
and the community.
• More broadly, corporates should strive for long-term 
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value creation for the common good (ie what is shared 
and beneficial for all or most members of a given 
community).
Lengthening executive and investors’ horizons
• To counter short-termism, executive and investor hori-
zons should be aligned to the long term.
• On the executive side, a more long-term oriented 
reporting structure (moving away from quarterly 
reporting) and pay structure for executives (eg deferred 
rewards and clawback provisions) would reduce short-
termism.
• More generally, integrated reporting by companies facil-
itates social and environmental transparency and thus 
increases the accountability of executives.
• On the investment side, a more long-term investment 
performance horizon (moving away from quarterly 
benchmarking) and incentives for long-term investors (eg 
loyalty shares) would promote long-term investment.
Engagement
• To become a force for long-term value creation, long-term 
(institutional) investors should build investor coalitions to 
cooperate on engagement with corporates on social and 
environmental issues.
Market efficiency and liquidity
• Raise awareness of alternative theories of market 
efficiency.
• The dominant view of liquidity (the degree to which an 
asset can be quickly bought or sold in the market without 
13
affecting the asset’s price) favours listed securities and is 
based on the efficient markets hypothesis.
• An alternative view is the adaptive markets hypothe-
sis, which implies that the degree of market efficiency 
depends on an evolutionary model of individuals adapt-
ing to a changing environment. That can explain why 
new risks, such as environmental risks, are not (yet) fully 
priced in.
Supervisory treatment
• Reduce the supervisory bias towards favouring ‘liquid’ 
investments (which are listed) and allow for ‘buy and 
hold’ investments. An example is the introduction of sus-
tainable retail investment funds, based on sustainability 
criteria (instead of transferability).
• Financial institutions should be stress-tested to identify 
overexposure to and concentration in carbon-intensive 
assets. These carbon stress tests make use of various 
climate scenarios, including the adverse scenario of late 
adjustment resulting in a ‘hard landing’, and have a long 
horizon over which adverse events could occur. 
2 SUSTAINABILITY CHALLENGES
2.1 Environmental challenges
There is increasing evidence that human activities are 
affecting the Earth system, threatening the planet’s future 
liveability. The planetary boundaries framework of Steffen et 
al (2015) defines a safe operating space for humanity within 
the boundaries of nine productive ecological capacities of the 
planet. The framework is based on the intrinsic biophysical 
processes that regulate the stability of the Earth system at the 
planetary scale. The green zone in Figure 1 is the safe operat-
ing space, yellow represents the zone of uncertainty (increas-
ing risk) and red indicates the zone of high risk.
Applying the precautionary principle, the planetary 
boundary itself lies at the intersection of the green and yellow 
zones. To illustrate how the framework works, we look at the 
control variable for climate change, the atmospheric concen-
tration of greenhouse gases. The zone of uncertainty ranges 
from 350 to 450 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide. 
At 399 ppm in 2015, we have already crossed the planetary 
boundary of 350 ppm. The upper limit of 450 ppm is con-
sistent with the goal (at a fair chance of 66 percent) to limit 
global warming to 2o Celsius above the pre-industrial level 
and lies at the intersection of the yellow and red zones.
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Figure 1: The planetary boundaries
Source: Reproduced with permission from Steffen et al (2015).
The current linear production and consumption system is 
based on extraction of raw materials (take), processing into 
products (make), consumption (use) and disposal (waste). 
Traditional business models centred on a linear system 
assume the ongoing availability of unlimited and cheap 
natural resources. This is increasingly risky because non-re-
newable resources, such as fossil fuels, minerals and metals, 
are increasingly under pressure, while potentially renewable 
resources, such as water, forests and fisheries, are declining in 
their extent and regenerative capacity.
With this linear economic system, we are crossing plane-
tary boundaries beyond which human activities might dest-
abilise the Earth system. In particular, the planetary bounda-
ries of climate change, land-system change, biodiversity loss 
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(terrestrial and marine) and biochemical flows (nitrogen and 
phosphorus, mainly because of intensive agricultural prac-
tices) have been crossed (see Figure 1). A timely transforma-
tion towards an economy based on sustainable production 
and consumption, including use of renewable energy and 
reuse of materials, can mitigate these risks to the stability of 
the Earth system.
2.2 Social foundations
Human rights provide the essential social foundation for all 
people to lead lives of dignity and opportunity. Human rights 
norms assert the fundamental moral claim each person has 
to life’s essentials, such as food, water, health care, education, 
freedom of expression, political participation and personal 
security. In the run-up to the 2012 Rio+20 Conference on Sus-
tainable Development, the social foundations were defined 
as the eleven top social priorities, grouped into three clusters, 
focused on enabling people to be: 1) well: through food 
security, adequate income, improved water and sanitation 
and health care; 2) productive: through education, decent 
work, modern energy services and resilience to shocks; and 
3) empowered: through gender equality, social equity and 
having political voice (Raworth, 2012).
While these social foundations only set out the minimum 
of every human’s claims, sustainable development envisions 
people and communities prospering beyond this, leading 
lives of creativity and fulfilment. Sustainable development 
combines the concept of planetary boundaries with the 
complementary concept of social foundations or bounda-
ries. Sustainable development means that current and future 
generations have the resources needed, such as food, water, 
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health care and energy, without stressing the Earth system 
processes (Raworth, 2012).
But many people still live below the social foundations of 
no hunger, no poverty (a minimum income of $1.25 a day), 
access to education and access to clean cooking facilities. 
More broadly, political participation, which is the right of 
people to be involved in decisions that affect them, is a basic 
value of society. The UN’s Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of 
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world”. Human rights are an important social founda-
tion. Next, decent work can lift communities out of poverty 
and underpins human security and social peace. The 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2015; 
see below) places decent work for all people at the heart of 
policies for sustainable and inclusive growth and develop-
ment. Decent work has several aspects: a basic living income 
(which depends on a country’s basic living basket), no 
discrimination (eg on the basis of gender, race or religion), no 
child labour, health and safety and freedom of association.
From a societal perspective, it is important for business 
to respect these social foundations and to ban underpay-
ment, child labour and human right violations, which are still 
happening in developing countries. A case in point is the use 
of child labour in factories in developing countries producing 
consumer goods, like clothes and shoes, to be sold by multi-
national companies in developed countries. These factories 
often lack basic worker safety features (Box 3). Another exam-
ple is the violations of the human rights of indigenous people, 
often in combination with land degradation and pollution, by 
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extractive companies in the exploration and exploitation of 
fossil fuels, minerals and other raw materials.
To highlight the tension between unbridled economic 
growth and sustainable development, we provide two 
examples. Box 2 describes the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
in the Gulf of Mexico. Box 3 shows the impact of the col-
lapse of a factory building in Bangladesh. These examples 
have in common underinvestment in safety to increase 
short-term profits.
Box 2: The Deepwater Horizon oil spill
The oil spill from the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform 
began on 20 April 2010, in the British Petroleum-operated 
Macondo Prospect in the Gulf of Mexico. An explosion on 
the drilling rig killed eleven workers and led to the largest 
accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum 
industry. The US Government estimated the total discharge 
at 4.9 million barrels. After several failed efforts to contain the 
flow, the well was declared sealed on 19 September 2010.
A massive response ensued to protect beaches, wetlands 
and estuaries from the spreading oil utilising skimmer 
ships, floating booms, controlled burns and oil dispersant. 
Oil clean-up crews worked on 55 miles of the Louisiana 
shoreline until 2013. Oil was found as far from the Deepwa-
ter Horizon site as the waters off the Florida Panhandle and 
Tampa Bay, where oil and dispersant mixture was embed-
ded in the sand. The months-long spill, along with adverse 
effects from the response and clean-up activities, caused 
extensive damage to marine and wildlife habitats and the 
fishing and tourism industries.
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Numerous investigations explored the causes of the 
explosion and record-setting spill. Notably, the US govern-
ment’s September 2011 report pointed to defective cement 
on the well, faulting mostly BP, but also rig operator Transo-
cean and contractor Halliburton. Earlier in 2011, a National 
Commission (2011) likewise blamed BP and its partners for 
a series of cost-cutting decisions and an inadequate safety 
system, but also concluded that the spill resulted from 
“systemic” root causes and that without “significant reform 
in both industry practices and government policies, might 
well recur”.
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Box 3: Rana Plaza factory collapse
The Rana Plaza collapse was a disastrous structural failure 
of an eight-storey commercial building that occurred on 24 
April 2013 in Bangladesh. The collapse of the building caused 
1,129 deaths, while approximately 2,500 injured people were 
rescued from the building alive. It is considered the deadliest 
garment-factory accident in history and the deadliest acci-
dental structural failure in modern human history.
The building contained clothing factories, a bank, 
apartments, and several shops. The shops and the bank on 
the lower floors were immediately closed after cracks were 
discovered in the building. The building’s owners ignored 
warnings to evacuate the building after cracks in the structure 
appeared the day before the collapse. Garment workers, earn-
ing €38 a month, were ordered to return the following day, 
and the building collapsed during the morning rush-hour.
The factories manufactured clothing for brands including 
Benetton, Bonmarché, the Children’s Place, El Corte Inglés, 
Joe Fresh, Monsoon Accessorize, Mango, Matalan, Primark 
and Walmart.
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2.3 Sustainable development
To guide the transformation towards a sustainable and inclu-
sive economy, the United Nations has developed the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN, 2015). The 17 UN 
Sustainable Development Goals are intended to stimulate 
action over the 2015-30 period in areas of critical importance 
for humanity and the planet (see Box 4 for an overview). To 
facilitate implementation, the 17 high level goals are broken 
down into 169 targets (see https://sustainabledevelopment.
un.org/topics/sustainabledevelopmentgoals). The UN Sus-
tainable Development Goals address challenges at the levels 
of the economy, society and the environment (or biosphere).
Figure 2 illustrates the three levels and the ranking 
between them. A liveable planet is a precondition (founda-
tion) for humankind to thrive. Next, we need a cohesive and 
inclusive society to organise production and consumption in 
order to ensure enduring prosperity for all. In their seminal 
book Why nations fail, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) show 
that political institutions that promote inclusiveness generate 
prosperity. Inclusiveness allows everyone to participate in 
economic opportunities. Next, there can be resource con-
flicts: unequal communities might disagree over how to share 
(and finance) public goods. These conflicts, in turn, break 
social ties and undermine the formation of trust and social 
cohesion (Barone and Mocetti, 2016).
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Box 4: UN Sustainable Development Goals (Source: UN, 2015)
The United Nations has developed 17 Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs) as part of the 2030 Sustainable 
Development Agenda. Following Rockström and Sukhdev 
(2015), we classify the SDGs according to the levels of the 
economy, the society and the environment. Nevertheless, 
we stress that the SDGs are interrelated. A case in point 
is the move to sustainable consumption and production 
(economic goal 12) and sustainable cities (societal goal 
11), which are instrumental to combat climate change 
(environmental goal 13). 
Economic goals
• Goal 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth, full and productive employment and 
decent work for all
• Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive 
and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation
• Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries
• Goal 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production 
patterns
Societal goals
• Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere
• Goal 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved 
nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture
• Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for 
all at all ages
• Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education 
and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all
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• Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women 
and girls
• Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable 
and modern energy for all
• Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, 
safe, resilient and sustainable
• Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for 
sustainable development, provide access to justice for all 
and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions 
at all levels
Environmental goals
• Goal 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management 
of water and sanitation for all
• Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and 
its impacts
• Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas 
and marine resources for sustainable development
• Goal 15: Protect, restore and promote sustainable use 
of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, 
combat desertification, and halt and reverse land 
degradation and halt biodiversity loss
Overall goal
• Goal 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and 
revitalise the Global Partnership for Sustainable Devel-
opment
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Figure 2: Sustainable development challenges at different levels
Source: Adapted from Rockström and Sukhdev (2015).
While it is tempting to start working on partial solutions 
at each level, the environmental, societal and economic 
challenges are interlinked. It is important to embrace an 
integrated social-ecological system perspective (Norström et 
al, 2014). Such an integrated system perspective highlights 
the dynamics that such systems entail, including the role of 
ecosystems in sustaining human wellbeing, cross-system 
interactions and uncertain thresholds.
A well-known example of cross-system interaction is the 
linear production of consumption goods at the lowest cost 
contributing to ‘economic growth’, while depleting natural 
resources, using child labour and producing carbon emis-
sions and other waste2.
Another cross-system interaction is global warming 
leading to more and more-intense disasters, such as storms, 
flooding and droughts. The low and middle-income countries 
2 We use carbon emissions as shorthand for greenhouse gas emissions, which 
include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O).
Economy
Society
Environment
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around the equator are especially vulnerable to these extreme 
weather events, which could damage a large part of their 
production capacity. The temporary loss of tax revenues and 
increase in expenditures to reconstruct factories and infra-
structure might put vulnerable countries into a downward 
fiscal and macro-economic spiral with an analogous increase 
in poverty (Schoenmaker and Zachmann, 2015). Social and 
environmental issues are thus interconnected, whereby the 
poor in society are more dependent on ecological services 
and are less well protected against ecological hazards.
An example of an uncertain threshold combined with 
feedback dynamics is the melting threshold of the Greenland 
ice sheet. New research has found that it is more vulnerable 
to global warming than previously thought. Robinson, Calov 
and Ganopolski (2012) calculate that a 0.9°C global temper-
ature rise from today’s levels could lead the Greenland ice 
sheet to melt completely. Such melting would create further 
climate feedbacks in the Earth ecosystem, because the melt-
ing of the ice cap could increase the pace of global warming 
(by reducing the refraction of solar radiation, which is 80 
percent from ice, compared with 30 percent from bare earth 
and 7 percent from the sea) and of rising sea levels. These 
feedback mechanisms are examples of tipping points and 
shocks, which might happen. 
Although sustainable development is a holistic concept, 
Norström et al (2014) argue for the addressing of trade-
offs between the level of ambition of economic, social and 
environmental goals and the feasibility of reaching them, 
recognising biophysical, social and political constraints. 
3 A FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE FINANCE
3.1 The role of the financial system
How can the financial system facilitate decision-making on 
the trade-offs between economic, social and environmental 
goals? Levine (2005) lists the following functions of the finan-
cial system:
• Produce information ex ante about possible investments, 
and allocate capital;
• Monitor investments and exert corporate governance 
after providing finance;
• Facilitate the trading, diversification and management of 
risk;
• Mobilise and pool savings;
• Ease the exchange of goods and services.
The first three functions are particularly relevant for 
sustainable finance. The allocation of funding to its most 
productive use is a key role of finance. Finance is therefore 
well positioned to assist in making strategic decisions on the 
trade-offs between sustainability goals. While broader con-
siderations guide an organisation’s strategy on sustainability, 
funding is a requirement for reaching sustainability goals.
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Finance plays this role at different levels. In the financial 
sector, banks, for example, define their lending strategies 
regarding which sectors and projects are eligible for lending 
and which not. Similarly, investment funds set their invest-
ment strategies, which direct choices over which assets to 
invests in and which assets to not invest in. The financial 
sector can thus play a leading role in the transition to a low 
carbon, circular economy. If the financial sector chooses to 
finance sustainable companies and projects, they can accel-
erate the transition.
In terms of monitoring their investments, investors also 
can have an influence over the companies in which they 
invest. Investors thus have a powerful role in controlling and 
directing corporate boards. The governance role also involves 
balancing the many interests of a corporation’s stakeholders. 
In section 3.2, we review the progressive thinking about how 
interests should be balanced, including the interests of the 
environment and society. A rising trend in sustainable invest-
ment is engagement with companies in the hope of reducing 
the risk of adverse events occurring in those companies.
Finance is good at pricing the risk of future cash flows for 
valuation purposes. As there is inherent uncertainty about 
environmental issues (eg exactly how rising carbon emissions 
will affect the climate, and the timing and shape of climate 
mitigation policies), risk management can help to deal with 
these uncertainties. Scenario analysis is increasingly used to 
assess the risk and valuation under different scenarios (eg cli-
mate scenarios; see Caldecott et al, 2014). When the (poten-
tial) price of carbon emissions in the future becomes clearer, 
investors and companies have an incentive to reduce these 
emissions. The key challenge is to take a sufficiently long 
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horizon, as sustainability is about the future. The remainder 
of this section and section 4 discuss the appropriate hori-
zon for sustainable finance and ways to overcome the bias 
towards short-termism. 
3.2 Three stages of sustainable finance
How can finance support sustainable development? Figure 3 
shows our framework for managing sustainable development 
at the different levels. As we have argued, there are interac-
tions between the levels. It is thus important to choose an 
appropriate combination of the financial, social and environ-
mental aspects.
Figure 3: Managing sustainable development
The concept of sustainable finance has evolved as part 
of the broader notion of business sustainability over the last 
few decades (eg Whiteman et al, 2013). Table 2 shows our 
typology for sustainable finance. The evolution highlights the 
broadening from shareholder value to stakeholder value (or 
triple bottom line: people, planet, profit). The final stage looks 
at the creation of common good value. To avoid the dichot-
Economy
Society
Environment
Financial return and risk: F
Impact on society: S
Impact on environment: E
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omy of private versus public goods, we use the term common 
good referring to what is shared and beneficial for all or most 
members of a given community. Next, the ranking indicates a 
shift from economic goals first to societal and environmental 
challenges (the common good). Importantly, the horizon 
is broadened from short term to long term as each stage is 
passed through.
In traditional finance, shareholder value is maximised by 
looking for the optimal financial return and risk combination. 
Table 2 labels this the finance-as-usual approach. Although 
shareholder value should also look at the medium to long 
term, there are built-in incentives for short-termism, such as 
quarterly financial reporting and monthly/quarterly bench-
marking of investment performance (see section 4). Finance-
as-usual is consistent with the argument of Friedman (1970) 
that “the business of business is business” and the only social 
responsibility of business is to use its resources and engage 
in activities designed to increase its profits as long as it stays 
within the rules of the game. Friedman (1970) argues that it is 
the task of the government to take care of social and environ-
mental goals and set the rules of the game for sustainability. 
We however argue, in line with the United Nations’ Sustain-
able Development Goals, that sustainable development is a 
joint responsibility of governments, companies and citizens. 
We do not see a case for not integrating sustainability into 
strategy and finance.
Sections 3.3 to 3.5 discuss our three stages of Sustainable 
Finance (SF) (Table 2). The stages move from finance first, to 
all aspects equal, and finally to social-environmental impact 
first (the ranking of factors in the third column of Table 2).
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Table 2: Framework for Sustainable Finance
Sustainable 
finance typology
Value created
Ranking 
of factors
Optimisation Horizon
Finance-as-usual
Shareholder 
value
F Max F Short term
Sustainable 
Finance 1.0
Refined 
shareholder 
value
F > S 
and E
Max F 
subject to S 
and E
Short term
Sustainable 
Finance 2.0
Stakeholder 
value
T = F + S 
+ E
Optimise T
Medium 
term
Sustainable 
Finance 3.0
Common 
good value
S and E 
> F
Optimise 
S and E 
subject to F
Long term
Source: Bruegel. Note: F = financial value; S = social impact; E = environmental 
impact; T = total value. At Sustainable Finance 1.0, the maximisation of F is 
subject to minor S and E constraints.
3.3 SF 1.0: Profit maximisation, while avoiding ‘sin’ 
stocks
A first step in sustainable finance is that financial institutions 
avoid investing in, or lending to, so-called ‘sin’ companies. 
These are companies with very negative impacts. In the 
social domain, they include, for example, companies that 
sell tobacco, anti-personnel mines and cluster bombs or that 
exploit child labour. In the environmental field, classic exam-
ples of negative impacts are waste dumping and whale hunt-
ing. More recently, some financial institutions have started to 
put coal, and even the broader category of fossil fuels, on the 
exclusion list because of carbon emissions. These exclusion 
lists are often triggered under pressure from non-governmen-
tal organisations, which use traditional and social media for 
their messages (Dyllick and Muff, 2016).
31
But the effects of exclusion and divestment are limited 
(Skancke, 2016). From a general equilibrium perspective, 
there is willing buyer for every share a financial institution 
sells. Divestment by a growing number of investors might 
reduce a company’s share price, which might in turn make 
raising new capital through issuing shares more expensive 
for the company. However, this is a minor source of funding 
compared to retained earnings and debt financing. Another 
effect is that divestment may stigmatise a sector or companies 
to the point where they lose their social license to operate 
(see section 3.5). This might lead to less investment in that 
sector. An exclusion criterion targeted at a sector or the worst 
performers within a sector could have an effect through set-
ting a norm for acceptable standards. 
A slightly more positive variant of the refined shareholder 
value approach is that financial institutions and companies put 
systems in place for energy and emissions management, sus-
tainable purchasing, green IT, green building and infrastructure, 
diversity and old age employment. The underlying objective 
of these activities remains economic. Though introducing sus-
tainability into business might generate positive side-effects for 
some sustainability aspects, the main purpose is to reduce costs 
and business risks, to improve reputation and attractiveness 
for new or existing human talent, to respond to new customer 
demands and segments, and thereby to increase profits, market 
positions, competitiveness and shareholder value in the short 
term. Business success is still evaluated from a purely economic 
point of view and remains focused on serving the business itself 
and its economic goals (Dyllick and Muff, 2016). Shareholder 
value or profit maximisation is still the guiding principle for the 
organisation, though with some refinements.
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3.4 SF 2.0: Internalisation of externalities to avoid risk
In Sustainable Finance 2.0, financial institutions explicitly 
incorporate the negative social and environmental externali-
ties into their decision-making. Over the medium to long-
term horizon, these externalities might become priced (eg 
a carbon tax) and/or might impact negatively on an institu-
tion’s reputation. Incorporating the externalities thus reduces 
the risk that financial investments become unviable. This 
risk is related to the maturity of the financial instrument, and 
is thus greater for equity (stocks) than for debt (bonds and 
loans). On the positive side, internalisation of externalities 
helps financial institutions and companies to restore trust, 
which is the mirror image of reputation risk.
Attaching a financial value to social and environmen-
tal impacts facilitates the optimisation process among 
the different aspects (F, S, E). Innovations in technology 
(measurement, information technology, data management) 
and science (life-cycle analyses, social life-cycle analyses, 
environmentally extended input-output analysis, environ-
mental economics) make the monetisation of social and 
environmental impacts possible (True Price, 2014). In this 
way, the total or true value T can be established by summing 
the financial, social and environmental values in an integrat-
ing way. Financial institutions and companies use a private 
discount rate (which is higher than the public discount rate 
because of uncertainties) to discount future cash flows. As 
social and, in particular, environmental impacts become 
manifest over a longer horizon and are also more uncertain 
than financial impacts, private discounting leads to a lower 
weighting of social and environmental value than financial 
value.
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The methodology for calculating the total value involves 
measuring, monetising and balancing financial and non-fi-
nancial values (True Price, 2014; KPMG, 2014). Figure 4 
illustrates the four steps to calculate the total value:
1. We start by calculating the financial value and quantifying 
and monetising the social and environmental impacts 
(bar 1);
2. We then internalise the social and environmental exter-
nalities and calculate the total value as the sum of the 
values (bar 2);
3. Next, we adjust to account for the combination of the 
three factors. As explained in section 2, there are several 
non-linear trade-offs between the economic, social and 
environmental aspects of corporate investment. The 
monetisation helps corporations to find the optimal com-
bination of the three factors. In our example, the corpora-
tion is able to reduce both the social and environmental 
impact from 3 to 1 at an extra cost of 1 (bar 3) by adapting 
its production process3;
4. Finally, we calculate the total value T* (bar 4).
3  It should be noted that reducing the social and environmental impact is not 
always costly. With the rapidly declining cost of solar energy for example, we 
are getting close to the point where the use of renewable energy can reduce 
carbon emissions without extra cost.
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Figure 4: From financial value to total value
Source: Bruegel. Note: F = financial value; S = social value; E = environmental 
value; T = total value; T* = optimised total value. The first two bars illustrate 
the values based on the original production process; the final two bars show 
the values based on the optimised production process. The vertical axis is 
expressed in monetary units.
Our example in Figure 4 shows that the internalisation of 
the externalities leads to an increase in the total value from 
9 (bar 2) to 12 (bar 4). In the traditional finance approach, 
which maximises F only, the original production process 
would be continued (bar 1 at 15 is higher than bar 3 at 14) 
and the additional value would not be realised. When pricing 
of the externalities and/or reputation damage materialise in 
the medium term, the old production process becomes obso-
lete and the new production process becomes more favour-
able. In the case of medium to long-term investments, the 
assets used in the original production process might become 
stranded, resulting in a loss of financial value (Caldecott et 
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al, 2014). To avoid this risk, companies (and their financiers) 
might start to internalise the externalities before the gov-
ernment (pricing, regulation), the employees (strike, talent 
drain) or the public (reputation, customer strike) do so.
Box 5 gives an example of how a sector can apply the total 
value methodology, also called the true price methodology, 
to products and make changes over the full value chain.
Box 5: The true price of roses from Kenya (Source: True Price, 2014)
A true price analysis was conducted to identify a business 
case for sustainable rose farming (True Price, 2014). The 
study covered T-hybrid roses of 20 grams from Lake Naivasha 
in Kenya and compared roses produced at a conventional 
farm to those produced at a sustainable farm. Mapping the 
supply chain showed that the retail prices of roses produced 
on both types of farms are on average the same (€0.70). The 
true price on the other hand was much lower for the sustain-
able rose (€0.74) than the conventional rose (€0.92). This dif-
ference in true price mainly stemmed from the environmen-
tal impact associated with transporting the roses via airfreight 
and the social impact in terms of workers’ incomes.
The true price analysis identified various projects to 
reduce environmental and social costs:
• Transport by ship to reduce carbon emissions;
• Solar powered greenhouse to reduce non-renewable 
energy use;
• Closed-loop hydroponics to reduce water and fertiliser 
usage;
• Training on health and safety to improve workers’ skills;
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• Gender committees to reduce harassment and gender 
discrimination;
• Pay a basic living wage to improve the wellbeing of 
workers.
The true price analysis maps the costs of each project and 
its effect on the profit and loss of an average farm. For exam-
ple, health and safety training would generate about €4,500 
profit per hectare, while switching to transport by sea would 
increase profit by €5,000 per hectare. Better social standards 
for rose-farm workers and more environmentally friendly 
growing and transportation techniques are financially feasi-
ble, without negatively affecting farm owners’ bottom lines.
Some improvements in social standards, such as paying 
a living wage to workers, were less feasible if farm owners 
would have to bear all the costs. Based on an economic 
value chain analysis, it was shown that providing a living 
wage could be possible when a fraction of the costs are 
borne by wholesale traders, retail traders and consumers. 
This strengthened the promotion of better social and envi-
ronmental standards.
While the monetisation of externalities helps to bring soci-
etal and environmental externalities into corporate deci-
sion-making, there are several caveats to the market-driven 
calculation of total or true value. First, monetisation cannot 
fully express the ethical aspects of externalities, such as 
human rights or health and safety (KPMG, 2014). The three 
capitals (financial, social and environmental) are also not 
substitutable. Next, working out total value can lead to 
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perverse outcomes: the negative environmental impact of 
deforestation, for example, can be offset by large economic 
gains (legitimising destruction). To avoid these outcomes, 
we incorporate the constraint that the social-environmen-
tal value cannot be reduced compared to its initial value. A 
final issue is participation (Coulson, 2016). Producers could 
involve stakeholders in the application of the true-value 
methodology to form a more inclusive and pluralist concep-
tion of risk and values for social and environmental impacts.
Sustainable Finance 2.0 comes in different shapes. 
Examples are triple bottom line (people, planet, profit) and 
integrated profit and loss accounting. Within corporate gov-
ernance, we can speak of an extended stakeholder approach, 
whereby not only direct stakeholders, such as shareholders, 
suppliers, employees and clients, but also society and envi-
ronment, as indirect stakeholders, are included.
3.5 SF 3.0: Contributing to sustainable development, 
while observing financial viability
Sustainable Finance 3.0 moves from risk to opportunity. 
Rather than avoiding (very) unsustainable companies from a 
risk perspective, financial institutions invest only in sustain-
able companies and projects. In this approach, finance is a 
means to foster sustainable development, for example by 
funding healthcare, green buildings, wind farms, electric car 
manufacturers and land-reuse projects. The starting point of 
SF 3.0 is a positive selection of investment projects based on 
their potential to generate positive social and environmental 
impacts. In this way, the financial system serves the sustaina-
ble development agenda in the medium to long term.
The question that then arises is how the financial part of 
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the decision is taken. An important component of sustainable 
development is economic and financial viability. Financial 
viability, in the form of a fair financial return (which at the 
minimum preserves capital), is a condition for sustainable 
investment and lending; otherwise projects might need to be 
aborted prematurely because of financial shortfalls. The key 
change is that the role of finance turns from primacy (profit 
maximisation) to serving (a means to contribute to sustainable 
development). It moves from the front row to the back row.
What is a fair financial return? Of the respondents to the 
Annual Impact Investment Survey (GIIN, 2016), 59 percent 
primarily target risk-adjusted, market-rate returns. Of the 
remainder, 25 percent primarily target below market-rate 
returns that are closer to market-rate returns, and 16 percent 
target returns that are closer to capital preservation. So the 
great majority pursues market, or close to market, returns, 
while a small group accepts lower returns for sustainability 
reasons.
More broadly, the question is whether investors (includ-
ing the ultimate beneficiaries, such as current and future 
pensioners) are prepared to potentially forego some financial 
return in exchange for social and environmental returns (eg 
enjoying their pension in a liveable world). Social preferences 
play an important role for investors in socially responsible 
investment (SRI) funds, while financial motives appear 
to be of limited importance (Riedl and Smeets, 2017). SRI 
investors expect to earn lower returns from SRI funds than 
from conventional funds, suggesting that they are willing to 
forego financial performance in order to invest according to 
their social preferences. However, it is ex ante not clear what 
the ultimate effect of impact investing is on financial return. 
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If investor coalitions, for example, could accelerate the 
transition towards sustainable development, there would be 
less chance of negative financial returns because of extreme 
weather events or stranded assets. This argument depends on 
sufficiently large amounts of investment moving to sustaina-
ble finance (see section 5). 
Moving to corporate governance, legitimacy theory under-
pins Sustainable Finance 3.0. Legitimacy theory indicates 
that companies aim to legitimise their corporate actions in 
order to obtain approval from society and thus, to ensure their 
continuing existence (Omran and Ramdhony, 2015). This 
social licence to operate represents a myriad of expectations 
that society has about how an organisation should conduct its 
operations. The corporation thus acts within the bounds and 
norms of what society identifies as socially responsible behav-
iour, including meeting social and environmental standards.
3.6 Comparing the stages: where are we?
The three stages of sustainable finance lead to different levels 
of realised social-environmental value. Sustainable Finance 
1.0 introduces a minimum level, SEV min, below which 
investors cannot go. Companies or investment projects that 
do not meet this minimum level are on an exclusion list. The 
next stage, Sustainable Finance 2.0, balances the privately 
discounted financial, social and environmental value in an 
overall approach based on evaluating the total value. We 
label this SEV private. For illustration purposes, we incorporate 
this privately discounted social-environmental value halfway 
along our social-environmental value scale in Figure 5. 
Finally, Sustainable Finance 3.0 maximises the social-envi-
ronmental value, SEV optimal. Companies and projects, which 
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deliver this maximised social-environmental value, are eligi-
ble for investment (inclusion list). 
Figure 5: Levels of social-environmental value (SEV)
Source: Bruegel. Note: SEV min = minimum level of social and environmental 
value; SEV private = maximised total value (= privately discounted financial, social 
and environmental value); and SEV optimal = maximised social and environmen-
tal value.
The first two stages aim to avoid reputation risk, as 
the public demands a minimum level of corporate social 
responsibility and externalities are expected to be priced-in 
at some stage. The third stage aims to grasp the opportunities 
of realising social-environmental impact through investment 
and lending.
Where are we currently on the social-environmental 
axis? The majority of firms are at the Sustainable Finance 
1.0 level, putting financial value first. About 30 to 40 percent 
of financial institutions and 20 percent of companies adopt 
sustainable principles in their investment and business 
practices (see Table 4). But these firms are only partly 
(fraction α) maximising total value. They are somewhere 
in between Sustainable Finance 1.0 and 2.0, which can be 
expressed as: max V = (1 - α) F + α T = F + α (S + E), in which 
V stands for the overall value maximised by the firm, F for 
financial value, T for total value (T = F + S + E), S for social 
value and E for environmental value. 
A fair approximation is that financial value is dominant 
SEV
 0% SEVmin SEVprivate SEVoptimal 100%
41
and social-environmental value is incorporated for about 10 
percent (α = 0.1). This implies that we are just above, but still 
quite close, to SEV min. To increase the social-environmental 
value, the real issue is to switch from Sustainable Finance 1.0 
to Sustainable Finance 2.0. Box 6 reports on a recent battle 
between the shareholder model (SF 1.0) and the stakeholder 
model (SF 2.0). Finally, the group of financial institutions 
adopting Sustainable Finance 3.0 is tiny, at less than 1 percent 
(Table 4). 
The framework is dynamic. Non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) put pressure on investors to raise the 
minimum level by expanding the number of exclusions. The 
introduction of government regulation or taxation on social 
and environmental externalities can cause an upward shift 
of the social-environmental component in the total value 
calculation.
Box 6: The aborted take-over of Unilever by Kraft Heinz
In February 2017, Kraft Heinz, the US food company, 
attempted to take over Unilever, the European food company 
(Financial Times, 2017). A deal would have brought together 
two companies with radically different business models and 
cultures. With a stable of slower-growing brands, Kraft Heinz 
is heavily concentrated in the US and underpinned by debt-fi-
nanced deals. It implemented aggressive cost-cutting strate-
gies to generate margin expansion that allowed it to repay the 
debt and bolster shareholder returns (shareholder model). 
Meanwhile, Unilever is better known for its strong brands and 
presence in some of the biggest emerging markets. Under its 
chief executive, Paul Polman, Unilever attempted to focus on 
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better balancing profitability with social and environmental 
sustainability (stakeholder model).
This was a big take-over battle. Kraft Heinz offered $143 
billion for Unilever, but Unilever did not want to give up its 
sustainable business model. In the end, Warren Buffett, the 
big financier behind Kraft Heinz, did not approve a hostile 
takeover and stopped the bidding of Kraft Heinz for Unilever.
In the aftermath of the aborted take-over, a debate started 
on the ‘protection’ of companies with stakeholder models 
against the aggressive bids of shareholder-model compa-
nies. Defences against takeovers, such as certified shares or 
priority shares with friendly shareholders, can reduce market 
discipline, which in turn might decrease the stock price of 
the company. We propose a societal cost-benefit analysis, 
including financial, social and environmental factors, based 
on the total or true value methodology (De Groot Ruiz and 
Schoenmaker, 2017). It is the responsibility of the manage-
ment of both the acquiring and target company to conduct 
this test. Similar to the fairness opinion of an investment 
bank as to whether the terms of a merger or acquisition are 
fair, an independent advisor would give a fairness opinion on 
the outcome of the societal cost-benefit test. A Commercial 
Division of the Court or a Take-Over Panel (as in the United 
Kingdom) would only approve a take-over or merger if and 
when this cost-benefit test showed a positive value for soci-
ety. When necessary the Court or Panel could appoint experts 
to re-calculate the societal cost-benefit test.
4 OBSTACLES TO SUSTAINABLE FINANCE
A move towards sustainable finance requires a transition 
away from the current financial system. What are the main 
obstacles to, and incentives for, adopting sustainable finance? 
Table 3 provides an overview of the sustainability players, 
including the instruments at their disposal, forums in which 
they might work together, and the opportunities and threats 
they face. While our focus is primarily on the role of investors4 
and companies, we include also governments, civil society 
(NGOs) and households in Table 3 for completeness. This 
section discusses two main obstacles to sustainable finance: 
insufficient collective effort and a bias towards the short term. 
Section 5 discusses the opportunities for sustainable finance.
4  We use the term investors as shorthand for financial institutions, including 
pension funds, insurance companies, fund managers, private equity and banks.
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4.1 Insufficient private effort
While the adoption of sustainable business and finance prac-
tices is a major advance towards sustainable development, 
it might not be sufficient for two reasons. First, the fallacy of 
composition arises when one concludes that something is 
true of the whole (macro) from the fact that it is true of every 
part (micro). Even if individual companies internalise social 
and environmental externalities, it is not certain that the 
planetary boundaries are not crossed. One example is the 
current drive of companies to reduce their carbon footprints. 
This eco-efficiency push is a welcome trend in itself, but the 
available evidence suggests that the projected trajectories 
for carbon emissions exceed the allowable carbon budget 
for staying below 2o Celsius of global warming (eco-effec-
tiveness). Dyllick and Muff (2016) called this discrepancy 
the “big disconnect”. Busch, Bauer and Orlitzky (2016) also 
made the paradoxical observation that increasing sus-
tainable investment does not necessarily spur sustainable 
development, and call for a system perspective, which we 
explore in section 5.
There are several reasons for the divergence between the 
micro and macro outcomes. First, financial institutions and 
companies use a private discount factor to discount future 
cash flows. Stern (2008) argues that the public discount factor 
should be very small or zero because the government should 
value current and future generations equally. Because social 
and environmental impacts are particularly felt in the long 
term, private discounting leads to insufficient effort from 
a social welfare perspective. Next, only about 20 percent of 
companies are actively managing their carbon footprints to 
some extent (Table 4). These micro efforts are not enough to 
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keep carbon emissions within the allowable carbon budget at 
the macro level.
Second, the boundary problem compounds the challenge 
of internalising externalities. When regulation for one sector 
is tightened, business will shift to other sectors and countries 
with fewer or no requirements (Goodhart, 2008). Exemptions 
in the EU emissions trading system, such as airlines operating 
between EU and non-EU countries, highlight the boundary 
problem (as well as the international coordination problem) 
in environmental regulation. Other examples are national 
regulations for products, which companies can circumvent 
by relocating production to less-strict countries. A solution 
to this problem might be the use of product or activity-based 
regulation (Schoenmaker and Wierts, 2015). 
Another way to address the boundary problem would 
be to monitor and mitigate financial imbalances across 
the entire financial sector. Schoenmaker and Van Til-
burg (2016) proposed that central banks and supervisors 
should monitor systemic financial imbalances resulting 
from ecological pressures building up and concentrating 
in financial institutions and markets. Supervisors can, 
for example, use carbon stress tests for a whole range of 
financial institutions to identify overexposures to, and con-
centrations in, carbon-intensive assets, which include not 
only the oil, gas and coal sectors but all sectors using fossil 
fuels as an input either in the production or in the use of 
their products (eg car manufacturers) and services. These 
carbon stress tests make use of various climate scenarios, 
including the adverse scenario of late adjustment resulting 
in a ‘hard landing’, and have a long horizon over which 
adverse events could occur.
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Finally, there are limits to what the private sector can 
achieve. While financial institutions are starting to look at 
social and environmental externalities, there is clearly a role 
for government to make finance fully sustainable through 
regulation and taxation of these externalities. The starting 
point is that much of the transition is driven by private invest-
ment, but that investment is threatened by government-in-
duced risk (Stern, 2015). Policies, governance and institutions 
create a risk-return balance on the basis of which investors 
decide whether or not to act. But it is government policy, 
including the stability and credibility of policy, that creates 
the framework for that investment and sets out a range of 
pricing and regulatory instruments to encourage the low-car-
bon transition. Stern (2015) adds that making sound policy is 
not just about the analysis and implementation of incentives, 
but also about social and personal responsibility and values. 
Moreover, the role of communities is often undervalued. 
Only with the involvement of community can we recycle 
and reuse. Interesting examples of the sharing economy (eg 
car-sharing schemes) are emerging. The role of private coali-
tions for sustainable finance is explored in section 5.
We are in the transition to a low-carbon, circular econ-
omy. The externalities of the current carbon-intensive 
economy are becoming increasingly clear to the wider public 
(eg more catastrophic weather events, droughts and flooding 
in countries close to the equator, air pollution). A case in 
point is California, where air pollution from heavy traffic in 
the 1990s prompted environmental regulations and stimu-
lated innovation, for example in the electric cars of Tesla and 
in solar technology. China, India and Mexico, for example, 
face similar, or even worse, air pollution today, which may 
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prompt at some point stricter environmental regulations in 
these countries. Finance is about anticipating such events 
and incorporating expectations into today’s valuations, which 
underpin investment decisions. Finance can thus contribute 
to a swift transition to a low-carbon economy.
4.2 Short-termism
The tragedy of the horizon is a major obstacle to sustainable 
finance (Carney, 2015). The costs of action are borne now, 
while the benefits are in the future. The impact of economic 
activity on society, and even more so on the environment, is 
typically felt in the long term. By contrast, the horizons that 
managers and investors in conventional finance work to are 
mostly short-term. As indicated in the right-hand column of 
Table 3, several practices reinforce short-termism (which we 
deal with in turn later in this section):
• Quarterly financial reporting by companies;
• Variable pay systems based on annual results;
• Monthly or quarterly benchmarks for measuring investor 
performance;
• Marking-to-market of investments;
• Supervisory treatment of illiquid investments.
These practices make the transition to sustainable finance 
difficult. There is a trade-off between using markets as a 
disciplining device for managers and investors and designing 
measures or incentives that foster their long-term behav-
iour. A common theme behind these practices is the widely 
accepted efficient markets hypothesis, which states that stock 
prices incorporate all relevant information and thus on 
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average reflect the long-term fundamental value of the firm 
(Fama, 1970). The efficient markets hypothesis reinforces the 
focus on stock price as a central performance measure for 
executive and investor performance.
An alternative to the efficient markets hypothesis is the 
adaptive markets hypothesis (Lo, 2015). Contrary to the 
neoclassical view that individuals maximise expected utility 
and have rational expectations, an evolutionary perspec-
tive makes considerably more modest claims. The degree 
of market efficiency depends on an evolutionary model of 
individuals adapting to a changing environment. Prices 
reflect as much information as dictated by the combination 
of environmental conditions and the number and nature of 
distinct groups of market participants, each behaving in a 
common manner and having a common investment horizon. 
For example, retail investors, institutional investors, market 
makers and hedge fund managers can be seen as distinct 
groups with differing investment horizons. If multiple groups 
(or the members of a single highly populous group) are com-
peting within a single market, that market is likely to be highly 
efficient. If, on the other hand, a small number of groups are 
active in a given market, that market will be less efficient. The 
adaptive markets hypothesis can explain why new risks, such 
as environmental risks, are not (yet) fully priced in, as not 
enough investors are examining these new risks5.
5  Andersson, Bolton and Samama (2016) argued that there is little awareness 
of carbon risk among (institutional) investors, and it is thus not priced by the 
market. Hong, Li and Xu (2016) investigated whether stock markets efficiently 
price risks brought on or exacerbated by climate change. Their findings support 
regulatory concerns that markets that are inexperienced with climate change 
underreact to such risks. Hong, Li and Xu (2016) thus call for corporate expo-
sure to climate risks to be disclosed.
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Quarterly financial reporting
There is ample evidence that the majority of firms view 
quarterly earnings as the key metric for an external audience, 
more so than the underlying cash flows (Graham, Harvey and 
Rajgopal, 2005). The pressure created by a high reporting fre-
quency to continuously achieve a strong share price induces 
managers to adopt a short-term perspective (myopia) in 
choosing the firm’s investments. Such pressures disappear 
when the reporting frequency is decreased. Infrequent 
reports could provide better incentives for project selection 
decisions even though they provide less information to the 
capital market (Gigler et al, 2014). Nevertheless, timely pub-
lication of information that has a material impact on a firm’s 
performance remains important.
Barton and Wiseman (2014) recommended focusing on 
metrics like ten-year economic value added, R&D efficiency, 
patent pipelines and multiyear return on capital investments. 
More generally, the nature of financial reporting should be 
broadened. Integrated reporting is a process founded on 
integrated thinking within a firm that results in a periodic 
integrated report about value creation over time, and related 
communications regarding aspects of value creation. Inte-
grated reporting facilitates transparency of social and envi-
ronmental aspects. The current process is largely bottom-up 
(with the exception of South Africa, which already requires 
integrated reporting): some firms have started to publish 
integrated reports. However, the quality and reliability of the 
reported information differs significantly. To speed-up this 
process, the Financial Stability Board set up the Bloomberg 
Task Force to provide a set of voluntary, consistent disclo-
sure recommendations for use by companies in providing 
52
information about their climate-related financial risks to 
investors, lenders and insurance underwriters (Task Force 
on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, 2017). At some 
point, best practices need to be incorporated into binding 
international accounting standards, adopted by the Inter-
national Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and supported 
by the International Organisation of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO). Finally, integrated reports would need to 
be audited, according to these future standards, to provide 
assurance of the reported information.
Variable pay systems
Executive directors’ bonuses based on annual results or paid 
in stock options reinforce the focus on short-term results 
(Edmans et al, 2017). More broadly, executives are primarily 
concerned with the direct impact of investments during their 
tenure, as current performance is a key factor for their career 
prospects. To address this short-term bias, a more long-term 
oriented pay structure for executives can be introduced. The 
deferred reward principle suggests that pay for exerting effort 
in the current period is spread over the current and future 
periods to achieve intertemporal risk-sharing. The payment 
of all or part of a bonus can thus be deferred and made 
contingent on subsequent events, such as the completion of a 
major strategy or project when the full impact of the invest-
ment becomes clear. Also the vesting period (or the lock-up 
period) for equity compensation can be lengthened, even 
after retirement. Another powerful tool is clawback provisions 
in executive compensation whereby an employer takes back 
money that has already been disbursed, sometimes with an 
added penalty (Bolton and Samama, 2013). Clawback provi-
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sions can be activated in case of fraud or accounting errors, 
but also in cases where subsequent losses show in hindsight 
that the executives received excess compensation.
Quarterly performance benchmarking 
Fund managers are evaluated on a regular basis against per-
formance benchmarks. The quarterly relative performance 
monitoring to which many funds and fund managers are 
subject results in the adoption of short-termist attitudes and 
approaches to the management of funds (Baker, 1998). More-
over, a greater proportion of institutional investors simply 
pursue passive, broad asset-class-allocation investment 
strategies, which means that a smaller fraction of sharehold-
ers is informed about any individual firm and its fundamental 
long-term value.
To overcome short-term interests, performance evaluation 
should be aligned with the time horizon of the investment 
strategy and underlying investments. Bolton and Samama 
(2013) proposed to introduce loyalty shares, which provide an 
additional reward to shareholders if they have held on to their 
shares for a contractually specified period of time, the so-called 
loyalty period (eg three, five or ten years). More specifically, 
Bolton and Samama (2013) suggested a reward in the form of a 
warrant giving the right to purchase a pre-determined number 
of new shares at a pre-specified price and granted to loyal 
investors at the expiration of the loyalty period. A major benefit 
of incentives for investors to hold their shares for the long-term 
is that it facilitates engagement of (institutional) investors with 
companies (see section 5). 
An early example of a loyalty share was Michelin in 1991, 
which granted loyalty shares in the form of warrants following 
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a dividend cut to compensate the most loyal shareholders for 
this loss of income (Bolton and Samama, 2013). Specifically, 
Michelin granted one call warrant for every 10 shares held 
on 24 December 1991, with a two year loyalty period. The call 
warrant was exercisable at a four year horizon (31 December 
1995) at an out-of-the-money strike price (ie a strike price – at 
which the warrant can be exercised – well above the share 
price) of 200 French francs, compared to a share price of 
about 115 francs at the time of the announcement (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Call warrant for loyal shareholders (Michelin share price and 
warrant strike)
Source: Bolton and Samama (2013). Note: The share price and warrant strike 
are in French francs (vertical axis). The loyalty period covered two years from 
end-1991 to end-1993, after which loyal shareholders received the warrant. 
The subsequent warrant subscription period, in which they could exercise the 
warrant, was from end-1993 to end-1995.
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Marking-to-market
Market prices give timely signals that can aid decision-mak-
ing. But in the presence of distorted incentives and illiquid 
markets, there are other harmful effects that inject artificial 
volatility into prices, which distorts real decisions. When 
markets are only imperfectly liquid in the sense that sales or 
purchases affect the short-term price dynamics, the illiquidity 
of the secondary market causes another type of inefficiency 
(Plantin, Sapra and Shin, 2008). A bad outcome for the asset 
will depress fundamental values somewhat, but the more 
damaging effect comes from the negative externalities gener-
ated by other firms selling. Under a mark-to-market regime, 
the value of someone’s assets depends on the prices at which 
others have managed to sell their assets. When others sell, 
observed transaction prices are depressed more than is 
justified by the fundamentals, exerting a negative effect on all 
others, but especially on those who have chosen to hold on 
to the asset. Anticipating this negative outcome, a short-ho-
rizon investor will be tempted to pre-empt the fall in price 
by selling the asset itself. However, such pre-emptive action 
will merely serve to amplify the price fall. In this way, the 
mark-to-market regime generates endogenous volatility of 
prices that impedes the resource allocation role of prices. This 
process can be in particular at work during times of crises.
The alternative, the historical cost regime, also leads to 
inefficiencies, as there are no adjustments for subsequent 
changes in the market values of assets. Assessing the pros and 
cons, Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2008) found that the damage 
done by marking to market is greatest when claims are (i) 
long-lived, (ii) illiquid, and (iii) senior. For junior assets trad-
ing in liquid markets, such as traded stocks, marking-to-mar-
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ket is superior to historical cost in terms of the trade-offs. But 
for senior, long-lived and illiquid assets and liabilities, such 
as bank loans and insurance liabilities, the harm caused by 
distortions can outweigh the benefits. Banks loans are, for 
example, typically carried at historic or nominal value, with 
deduction of expected credit losses (ie impairments). 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the interna-
tional accounting standard for financial instruments (IAS 39) 
was amended to exempt financial instruments from fair value 
accounting, when they are managed on an amortised cost 
basis in accordance with a financial firm’s business model. 
To keep the appropriate perspective, the fair value discussion 
focuses on a subset of assets (ie financial instruments) and on 
unusual circumstances. Shleifer and Vishny (2011) consid-
ered fire sales, where fair value accounting reinforces the 
downward spiral and is thus counterproductive. The unusual 
circumstances should be confined to these instances when 
the markets are clearly illiquid, otherwise undue forbearance 
may arise. The benefit of fair value accounting is that man-
agement and regulators get a clear signal from the markets 
prompting them to act. Several studies (eg Laux and Leuz, 
2010) argue that fair value accounting did not play a major 
role in the financial crisis.
Supervisory treatment
Liquid investments, which can be traded and thus marked 
to market on a daily basis, carry a relatively low supervisory 
capital charge, as financial firms can divest these assets at 
short notice. The supervisory treatment is based on mark-
ing-to-market, liquidity and efficient market measures. 
By contrast, private market and direct investments carry a 
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higher capital charge to cater for the ‘risk’ that the investment 
cannot be liquidated at short notice. Environmental projects 
typically have a long horizon and cannot be measured on a 
frequent basis. The results are only visible after a period of 
time. Land restoration projects, for example, have a horizon 
of twenty years (Ferwerda, 2016). When regulated financial 
institutions hold an investment to maturity, solutions to avoid 
or reduce the need for a supervisory surcharge for illiquidity 
can be found in measuring the potential and the risk of a 
project over the full cycle of that project (eg using scenario 
analysis) rather than on a daily mark-to-market basis. Also at 
the retail level, there is bias towards liquid and transferable 
securities. Box 7 provides a proposal for sustainable retail 
funds.
Box 7: Sustainable retail funds6
The main vehicle for retail investors is the Undertakings for 
Collective Investments in Transferable Securities (UCITS; 
2009/65/EC). UCITS are collective investment funds operat-
ing freely throughout the European Union on the basis of a 
single authorisation. The UCITS concept is based on a small 
set of core criteria: 1) diversification rules; 2) concentration 
limits; 3) transferability of listed securities; and 4) strictly 
regulated use of derivatives for protection purposes only.
The transferability requirement assumes a liquid market 
in the respective securities. An overreliance on market liquid-
ity is misguided. Shleifer and Vishny (2011) analysed the role 
of asset ‘fire sales’ in depleting the balance sheets of finan-
6  I would like to thank Linda van Goor for the idea of sustainable retail funds 
based on the UCITS concept.
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cial institutions and aggravating the fragility of the financial 
system during the 2007-08 financial crisis. Assets sold in fire 
sales can trade at prices far below value in best use, causing 
severe losses to sellers. While liquidity is useful for retail 
investors, we suggest that the notion that only listing provides 
sufficient liquidity be revised into a concept of ‘liquidity that 
ensures a balanced control of in- and outflow of cash by fund 
managers’ combined with a withdrawal limit on fund shares. 
This would acknowledge that fund managers should hold a 
diversified buffer of liquid assets consisting of different asset 
categories that they can use to cover short-term liquidity 
needs.
The objectives of the EU capital markets union (CMU) 
include among others fostering retail investment in capital 
markets and harnessing finance to deliver sustainability 
(European Commission, 2015). To reach out to retail inves-
tors, the European Commission could prepare legislation 
for setting up liquid, sustainable retail investment funds 
or undertakings with a EU-passport. The UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (see Box 4) could be used to incorporate 
sustainability in the investment criteria of these funds. Such 
‘Undertakings for Collective Investments in Sustainable 
Securities’ (UCISS) would keep the UCITS’ diversification 
rules and concentration limits, as well as the strictly regulated 
use of derivatives for protection purposes only. For liquidity, 
UCISS would replace the requirements of listing and trans-
ferability with the concept of sound liquidity management, ie 
balanced control of in- and outflow of cash by fund manag-
ers. Finally, UCISS would incorporate a definition of eligible 
investments that meet enforceable sustainability criteria.
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In summary, a possible cost of financial markets is short-ter-
mism, with agents in the financial intermediation chain 
giving near-term outcomes too much weight at the expense of 
longer-term opportunities. There is evidence that stock prices 
in the UK and the US have historically over-discounted future 
dividends by 5 to 10 percent, suggesting significant evidence 
of myopia (Davies et al, 2014). Possible incentive-compatible 
solutions to counter short-termism would be more long-term 
oriented pay structures for executives (eg clawback provisions 
and deferred rewards) and incentives for long-term investors 
(eg loyalty shares). Moreover, the reliance on mark-to-market 
valuations should be reduced.
5 COALITIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE FINANCE
A classic problem in environmental economics is the 
tragedy of the commons. This refers to the situation within 
a shared-resource system when individual users acting 
independently according to their own self-interest, behave 
contrary to the common good of all users by depleting that 
resource through their collective action. Common resources 
are not only natural resources, which can be depleted, 
but also the use of the air or water as sinks, which can be 
overused. A standard approach to preserve a common good 
is government taxation or regulation (top row of Table 3) 
or vesting of private property rights. However, an exclusive 
regulatory approach towards curbing carbon emissions has 
been elusive to date.
5.1 Coalitions as an alternative
Ostrom (1990) looked beyond centralised regulation by 
external authorities or private property rights as the means to 
govern common pool resources. She offered design princi-
ples for how common resources can be governed sustainably 
and equitably in a community. The central idea is to build 
coalitions, which develop rules governing the use of the 
common good, monitor members’ behaviour, use graduated 
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sanctions for rule violators and provide accessible means for 
dispute resolution. The key to build an effective and inclusive 
coalition is to define clear group boundaries, whereby the 
major parties are covered, and to ensure that those affected 
by the rules can participate in modifying the rules (Ostrom, 
1990). As suggested in this essay, the rules governing the 
use of a common good, such as the available carbon budget, 
should follow a system approach.
The efforts to limit climate change provide an illustration 
of the proposed system approach. Currently, countries make 
climate pledges within the framework of the annual confer-
ences of the parties (COPs) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2015). The aggre-
gated climate pledges so far (technically called the Nationally 
Determined Contributions) still imply likely global warming 
of more than 2oC (UNFCCC, 2016), but there is an expecta-
tion that countries will increase their pledges over time (the 
ratchet effect)7 as part of predefined five-year review cycles. 
For instance, within the overall COP framework, compa-
nies could introduce a global sub-COP framework with a 
downward trajectory of corporate carbon budgets under the 
auspices of the World Economic Forum (WEF) or the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 
(see Table 4 and Figure 7)8. Private and public corporations 
(including utilities) would be included. 
7  The ratchet effect refers to escalations in price or production that tend to 
self-perpetuate. Once prices have been raised, it is difficult to reverse these 
changes, because people tend to be influenced by the previous best or highest 
level.
8  This idea emerged in discussions with Patrick Bolton.
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Figure 7: Coalitions for sustainable finance
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Source: See Table 4.
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Company Revenues (US$b)
1 Walmart 482
2 Shell 272
3 Volkswagen 237
4 Toyota 237
5 BP 226
Others 7,123
Total 8,577
Fortune 500 total revenues 27,634
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Corporations: World Economic Forum
Company Revenues (US$b)
1 Walmart 482
2 Shell 272
3 Volkswagen 237
4 Toyota 237
5 Apple 234
Others 3,769
Total 5,230
Fortune 500 total revenues 27,634
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Corporations: World Business Council for Sustainable Development
Company Assets (US$b)
1 Group Credit Cooperatif 26
2 Vancity 18
3 Amalgamated Bank New York 18
4 Triodos Bank 14
5 GLS Bank 5
Others 30
Total 110
Global banking assets 152,961
28%
Apple Toyota Volkswagen Shell Walmart Others
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The starting point could be the pledged carbon reductions 
of the largest companies (eg the Fortune 500). The Bloomb-
erg principles for climate-related financial disclosures could 
be used for yearly reporting and monitoring of corporate 
progress (Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclo-
sures, 2017). This system approach would thus be based on a 
mix of top-down calculation of the overall sustainable carbon 
budget and bottom-up declarations of carbon reduction 
intentions by companies.
As part of their intensifying corporate governance 
approach, long-term asset managers, such as pension funds 
and insurance companies, can stimulate companies to 
operate within the ‘system’ boundaries and can hold them 
accountable. To ensure companies stay within these bound-
aries or budgets, asset managers also need to report the 
carbon footprint (as well as other environmental and social 
dimensions) of their investments. Next, asset managers need 
to cooperate on engagement with companies by forming 
investor coalitions on long-term sustainable investment 
(McNulty and Nordberg, 2016). Examples of long-term inves-
tor coalitions are the Principles for Responsible Investment 
(PRI), Focusing Capital on the Long Term Global (FCLT 
Global), the Global Impact Investing Network (GINN) and 
the Global Alliance for Banking on Values (GABV). Figure 7 
provides an overview of these investor coalitions, including 
the five largest members. This overview shows that the mem-
bers are drawn from North America, Europe and Asia. These 
coalitions have thus the potential to become a global force 
for change. The long-term focus of these coalitions would 
include avoiding environmental and social hazards, which 
materialise over the medium to long term, and grasping the 
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opportunities offered by low-carbon investment which pays-
off in the long term. Engagement is a very powerful tool to 
improve social and environmental standards in the corporate 
sector, where the social and environmental externalities are 
caused (Skancke, 2016). The ultimate aim is to steer business 
to truly sustainable practices spurred by a macro perspective.
5.2 Reasons to join coalitions for sustainable finance
What are the incentives for long-term investors to join these 
emerging coalitions for sustainable finance? One incentive 
is that members can seize the opportunities of the transition 
towards a sustainable economy. The members of PRI, FCLT 
Global, GIIN, GABV and WBCSD are intrinsically motivated to 
work on long-term value creation (see Table 4). Other investors 
might be prompted by NGO campaigning and/or pressure 
from their peers to join these coalitions. Next, investors might 
be incentivised to join in order to avoid the risk of stranded 
assets (Litterman, 2015). Collective advocacy by an investor 
coalition to push governments to clarify their agendas on, for 
example, climate mitigation (including timing of regulations 
and taxes) could reduce policy-related uncertainty over the 
future value of assets (Skancke, 2016). Such clarity over future 
policies would also help to stimulate investment in new clean 
technologies and projects. Finally, Dimson, Karakas and Li 
(2015) provided evidence that collaboration among activist 
investors is instrumental in increasing the success rate of social 
and environmental engagements.
As a follow-up to the pioneering work of Ostrom (1990) on 
design of institutions for governing common resources, we 
recommend further research on building effective coalitions 
for sustainable finance in parallel with regulatory initiatives 
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to address the social and environmental externalities. Private 
and public initiatives can reinforce each other. Private action 
can pave the way for public rules and taxes. In turn, public 
endorsement can strengthen private coalitions. To start this 
broad research agenda, we make an initial assessment of the 
main coalitions for sustainable finance (Table 4). For asset 
management, we take PRI, FCLT Global and GINN. For bank-
ing, we include the Equator Principles for project finance and 
GABV. For companies, we take WEF and WBCSD. Following 
the design principles developed by Ostrom (1990), we exam-
ine the following features of the coalitions:
1. Clearly defined boundaries: which percentage of the 
relevant group is covered by the coalition;
2. Congruence between provision rules and local con-
ditions: membership rules restricting the use of the 
common good are related to local conditions; this can be 
translated into the sustainable finance typology that the 
coalition follows;
3. Collective choice arrangements: individuals affected by 
the operational rules and principles can participate in the 
modification of these rules and principles;
4. Monitoring: reporting on meeting the rules and princi-
ples and assessment of the extent to which the rules and 
principles are followed;
5. Sanctions and rewards: how to punish violations by mem-
bers or to reward those members that comply; and
6. Conflict resolution mechanism: members and their offi-
cials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve 
conflicts between members or between members and 
officials.
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Table 4 shows that the larger coalitions – covering 20 to 
40 percent of the relevant reference group – are somewhere 
between Sustainable Finance 1.0 and 2.0. These coalitions 
include social and environmental factors in their decision-mak-
ing, alongside the financial factor. It is interesting to note that 
members progressively tighten the principles in subsequent 
versions, providing a dynamic component to these coalitions 
– some sort of virtuous cycle. However, not all coalitions have 
clear principles guiding the behaviour of their members. PRI 
and WBCSD have well-defined sustainability principles, which 
are also monitored and are closer to Sustainable Finance 2.0 
than the other coalitions (FCLT Global, the Equator Principles 
and WEF). Next, the coalitions adopting Sustainable Finance 
3.0 put social and environmental factors first and the financial 
factor second. The coverage of these advanced coalitions is very 
small with less than 1 percent of the relevant group covered. We 
classify GABV in between Sustainable Finance 2.0 and 3.0 as 
GABV stresses the triple bottom line (2.0) – people, planet and 
prosperity – as well as social and environmental challenges (3.0). 
There is clearly an inverse relationship between the degree of 
sustainability and the size of the coalition.
A key aspect is monitoring of the coalition members. On 
this feature, the picture is very diffuse. Some coalitions leave 
monitoring and reporting explicitly to the members (eg the 
Equator Principles Association), while the WBCSD explicitly 
reviews and benchmarks its members’ annual sustainability 
reports. The WBCSD even threatens to expel members that do 
not meet the ‘membership conditions’. Most of the coalitions 
have a conflict resolution mechanism. Only the WBCSD has 
a mechanism for conflicts of interests and can form a crisis 
management team.
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Finally, as short-termism is one of the main barriers to 
sustainable finance, we recommend that the coalitions should 
adopt a long-term focus and take the time for new solutions to 
develop and flourish without quarterly benchmarking.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Sustainable finance looks at how finance (investing and 
lending) interacts with economic, social, and environmental 
issues. This essay shows how sustainable finance has the 
potential to move from finance as a goal (profit maximisa-
tion) to finance as a means. In his book Finance and the Good 
Society, Shiller (2012) provides some stimulating examples 
of how finance can serve society and its citizens by allocating 
funding to new projects. The same could be done to address 
the environmental challenges.
This essay provides a new framework for sustainable 
finance. The traditional shareholder model places finance 
first and has a short-term horizon, while the stakeholder 
approach seeks to balance the financial, social and envi-
ronmental aspects and is more focused on the long term. 
Our assessment of the current system shows that the social 
and environmental factors are only partly incorporated; 
the financial factor still dominates. There is also tension 
between the models. To avoid a fall back to the narrow 
shareholder model during takeover contests, we recom-
mend application of a societal cost-benefit test when a 
shareholder-oriented firm tries to take over a stakehold-
er-oriented firm. The takeover should only be approved if 
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the test indicates a positive total value – based on financial, 
social and environmental values – for society.
This essay also examines obstacles to the adoption of 
sustainable finance. To address insufficient corporate efforts, 
governments should adopt appropriate regulation and taxa-
tion (eg appropriate carbon taxes). Finance is about antic-
ipating such policies and incorporating expectations into 
today’s valuations for the purposes of investment decisions. 
To counter short-termism, we recommend several incen-
tives to align executive and investor horizons over the longer 
term. On the executive side, incentive-compatible measures 
include a more long-term oriented financial reporting struc-
ture (moving away from quarterly reporting) and an executive 
pay structure with deferred rewards and clawback provi-
sions. On the investment side, the investment performance 
horizon should go beyond the current standard of quarterly 
benchmarking. Institutional investors can be incentivised 
to engage with companies by providing loyalty shares if they 
hold shares in the company for a loyalty period of three, five 
or ten years. 
Finally, we outline how long-term investors can build 
effective coalitions to engage with, and exert influence on, 
the companies in which they invest. In this way, long-term 
investors can steer companies towards sustainable business 
practices and accelerate the transformation to sustainable 
development.
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